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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 This is an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging the first-
degree murder conviction of Appellant Leroy Thomas, a/k/a ―John Wayne‖ (―Wayne‖).
1
  
We granted Wayne a certificate of appealability with respect to whether trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by 1) failing to investigate and present the testimony of 
known eyewitnesses, and 2) promising during opening argument at trial to present certain 
                                            
 
1
 We refer to the Appellant Leroy Thomas as ―Wayne‖ to be consistent with the 
parties‘ briefs, Appellant‘s counsel‘s presentation of the case at oral argument, and to 
avoid confusion with the victim and his brother, who are also named Thomas but are 
unrelated to the Appellant. 
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evidence but then failing to do so.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the 
District Court‘s denial of Wayne‘s habeas petition.
2
   
I. 
 We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  While the procedural history underlying Wayne‘s appeal is 
somewhat complex, we will set forth only those matters necessary to our analysis. 
A. 
 During the night of June 28, 1994, Wilbert Thomas (―Wilbert‖) was fatally shot.   
Earlier that day, Wayne, co-defendant Rohn Vidal, and an unidentified female had 
allegedly abducted and threatened the victim‘s brother, Carlton Thomas (―Carlton‖), in 
connection with money that was supposedly owed to the assailants‘ associate, Clinton 
Fishley.  All of the men had grown up together in Jamaica and were well-known to each 
other.  Carlton testified that the three abductors drew guns and demanded a ride in his car.  
Carlton stated that Wayne‘s gun looked like a nine millimeter.  The three abductors 
searched Carlton‘s car and found about $300 before leaving him handcuffed to the 
gearshift.  
 Shortly before 11:00 p.m. that same evening, Wilbert was standing on the porch of 
a Philadelphia row home with Carlton and another childhood friend, Courtney Ellison 
(―Ellison‖).  Carlton saw Wayne and Vidal pass by in a car driven by Fishley.  Carlton 
warned Wilbert and Ellison that he feared for his safety based on the incident that 
                                            
 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Wayne‘s habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2254(a).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1291 and 2253. 
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occurred earlier in the day, and then fled the area.  Soon afterward, two gunmen stormed 
the porch on which Wilbert was standing from different directions, each firing guns.   
 Ellison managed to escape and was the only witness who testified to have seen the 
shooting.  Ellison identified Wayne and Vidal as the gunmen.  He testified that Wayne 
and Vidal arrived at the house at the same time.  The two repeatedly fired three guns, 
Wayne firing two and Vidal firing one, with Wayne reloading and continuing to fire after 
reloading.  As Wilbert attempted to enter the home, Wayne continued to shoot at him 
from the sidewalk and ultimately shot Wilbert multiple times.  Ballistics evidence 
corroborated Ellison‘s eyewitness account of the paths taken by Wayne and Vidal as they 
converged on the house.  The medical examiner testified that Wilbert died of gunshot 
wounds from three bullets.  A Criminal Evidence Specialist and a Police Officer testified 
that the cartridges and projectiles collected around the scene were nine millimeter, as 
were the projectiles recovered from the victim‘s body.  The cartridges were found on the 
sidewalk and street; the projectiles were found on the porch.   
 Wayne and Vidal were jointly tried in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.   
Wayne‘s counsel delivered a brief opening statement.  Counsel informed the jury that the 
defense would demonstrate that Wayne ―was not involved in [the homicide]‖ at all.  (A. 
51.)  Defense counsel asserted that Wayne‘s innocence would be shown through Wayne‘s 
own testimony and through some of the ―many, many people‖ who witnessed the 
shooting.  (A. 50.)  Trial counsel did not follow through with either promise.  The jury 
deliberated over the course of two days and found Wayne guilty of first-degree murder of 
Thomas, Vidal guilty of third-degree murder, and found both guilty of conspiracy and 
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possessing an instrument of crime.
3
  Wayne received a sentence of life imprisonment.  
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Wayne, 723 A.2d 238 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998) (unpublished memorandum) (―Wayne-1‖). 
B. 
 Wayne then sought relief under Pennsylvania‘s Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(―PCRA‖).  See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 9541 et seq.  In an amended petition, he raised three 
claims, including that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony from  
Raygina Fearon (―Raygina‖), Diana Fearon and Dominique Long, who were known 
eyewitnesses to the shooting.
4
  The centerpiece of Wayne‘s bid for post-conviction relief 
was Raygina‘s alleged eyewitness account of the shooting and counsel‘s failure to pursue 
this aspect of Wayne‘s defense.  Wayne advanced this argument, in part, by referencing 
counsel‘s opening statement at trial that he would present witnesses to attest to Wayne‘s 
innocence.   
 Attached as an exhibit to the PCRA petition was the statement Raygina gave to 
police within hours of the shooting, which was provided to counsel before trial.  Raygina 
told police she lived at the address where the shooting occurred and that she was on the 
porch along with Diana Fearon and Dominique Long when Wilbert was shot.  Raygina 
                                            
 
3
 Wayne and Vidal were both acquitted of kidnapping, robbery, conspiracy, and 
possessing an instrument of crime in connection with events that allegedly occurred 
earlier that day with Carlton. 
 
4
 Wayne‘s other claims concerned the trial court‘s allowance of evidence of and 
jury instructions on Wayne‘s effort to evade arrest, and the jury charge on conspiracy and 
reasonable doubt.   
6 
 
stated that she saw the shooter, whom she merely described as a ―[b]lack guy.‖  (A. 491.)  
Raygina did not see anyone else shooting or possessing a gun.   
 Also attached to the PCRA petition was a signed declaration, given under penalty 
of perjury, that Raygina provided to PCRA counsel in 2001 – over six years after 
Wilbert‘s murder.
5
  Raygina reiterated that she was taken to the police station a few hours 
after the shooting and confirmed that she provided a statement to the police describing 
her account of the crime.  Raygina declared that, after giving her statement to the police, 
she was not shown photographs, asked to view a lineup, questioned by the police again, 
visited by a defense attorney, or called to testify about what she saw.  Raygina also stated 
that, after watching an episode of Crime Fighters, which featured a picture of Wayne as 
being wanted for the murder that occurred on her porch, she realized that Wayne was not 
the man whom she saw shoot the victim.  Raygina also repeated that she only saw a 
single shooter with one gun that night.
6
   
 The PCRA court dismissed the petition without holding a hearing, concluding that 
none of Wayne‘s claims had merit.  Wayne appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
where he expanded his three discrete claims into eight issues.  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
                                            
 
5
 Wayne erroneously refers to Raygina‘s written statement as an ―affidavit.‖  
Although signed under penalty of perjury, the document was not notarized.  Pennsylvania 
law defines an ―[a]ffidavit‖ as a document ―sworn to or affirmed before an officer 
authorized by the laws of th[e] Commonwealth to take acknowledgments of deeds, or 
authorized to administer oaths.‖  See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1991.   
   
 
6
 Also attached to the PCRA petition were statements attributed to Diana Fearon 
and Dominique Long.  However, these statements were not considered as evidence 
because Diana Fearon and Dominique Long did not sign the documents.   
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839 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (unpublished memorandum) (―Wayne-2‖).  Among 
the issues presented on appeal were whether the PCRA court had erred in failing to hold a 
hearing on trial counsel‘s alleged failure to investigate the three eyewitnesses and 
whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to furnish evidence of 
Wayne‘s innocence, as he said he would do in his opening statement.  The Superior Court 
found that the claim based upon the failure to present promised evidence of innocence 
had been waived because it had not been presented as a separate claim in the PCRA 
petition.  As to the ineffective assistance claim pertaining to the purported eyewitnesses, 
the Superior Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing.    
 On remand, the PCRA court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 18, 
2004.  However, six days before the hearing, counsel for Wayne informed the PCRA 
court that he had just learned that Raygina had died – although she had passed away over 
a year earlier on March 2, 2003, while the previous PCRA appeal was pending in the 
Superior Court.  Counsel for Wayne asked the PCRA court to postpone the hearing and 
allow the parties to provide briefs concerning the admissibility of Raygina‘s statement.  
In his brief, Wayne argued that Raygina‘s statement should be admitted as substantive 
evidence.  On October 18, 2005, the PCRA court declined to admit Raygina‘s statement 
as substantive evidence and dismissed the matter without holding a hearing. 
 Wayne again appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 908 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (―Wayne-3‖).  He raised four separate 
issues.  First, Wayne asserted that the PCRA court had erred in failing to conduct a 
hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the failure to investigate and 
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present testimony from Raygina.  Second, Wayne contended that the PCRA court had 
erred in refusing to admit Raygina‘s declaration as substantive evidence.  The third and 
fourth issues concerned the PCRA court‘s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing.  The 
Superior Court rejected Wayne‘s arguments and affirmed.  It held that Raygina‘s 
statement was inadmissible hearsay under Pennsylvania evidentiary rules and its 
admission was not required by due process.  Id. at 355-56.  The Superior Court also 
deemed the other issues waived because Wayne did not properly present argument on 
these discrete questions in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 
2119(a).  Id. at 353-54. 
 Wayne then filed the habeas petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
raising, inter alia, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for failing to investigate 
Raygina and not following through with promises made in the opening statement about 
the testimony of Wayne and other witnesses.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge‘s Report and Recommendation that the habeas petition be dismissed and a 
certificate of appealability be denied.  Wayne filed a notice of appeal.   
 We granted a certificate of appealability with respect to Wayne‘s claims that trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 1) failing to interview and present the 
testimony of Raygina Fearon, Diana Fearon and Dominique Long, and 2) promising 
during the opening statement to present certain evidence but then failing to do so.   
II. 
 Before reaching the merits of Wayne‘s ineffective assistance argument, we must 
address the threshold question of whether Wayne is procedurally barred from pursuing 
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his claims by virtue of state court rulings predicated upon Wayne‘s failure to comply with 
state court procedural requirements.  A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas 
corpus unless the petitioner ―has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
State.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  To do so, ―the petitioner must fairly present all 
federal claims to the highest state court before bringing them in federal court.‖  Stevens v. 
Del. Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Even when a petitioner asserts a claim in state court, however, a federal court 
may not review it on the merits where a state court‘s denial of relief rests on a violation 
of a state procedural rule, provided that the state rule ―is independent of the federal 
question [presented] and adequate to support the judgment.‖  Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 
187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  The requirements of ―independence‖ and 
―adequacy‖ are distinct.  See Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 557-59 (3d Cir. 2004).  
State procedural grounds are not independent, and will not bar federal habeas relief, if the 
state law ground is so ―interwoven with federal law‖ that it cannot be said to be 
independent of the merits of a petitioner‘s federal claims.  See Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 739-40 (1991).     
 A state rule is ―adequate‖ for procedural default purposes if it was ―firmly 
established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported 
default.‖  Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 327 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  
These requirements ensure that ―federal review is not barred unless a habeas petitioner 
had fair notice of the need to follow the state procedural rule,‖ Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 
F.3d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 2005), and that ―review is foreclosed by what may honestly be 
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called ‗rules‘ . . . of general applicability[,] rather than by whim or prejudice against a 
claim or claimant.‖  Id. at 708. 
A. 
 Because it is evident that Wayne‘s failure to comply with state law procedural 
requirements resulted in the Pennsylvania Superior Court deciding that Wayne had 
waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based upon an alleged failure to 
investigate and an alleged failure to deliver promised testimony, we must determine 
whether adjudication of those claims on the merits is now foreclosed in this federal 
habeas corpus proceeding.  Our consideration of this issue is plenary.  See Levya v. 
Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  
 In Wayne-2, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Wayne waived the claim 
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by breaking his promise to provide 
evidence of Wayne‘s innocence because Wayne had failed to argue the claim separately 
in his first counseled PCRA petition.  Instead, Wayne embedded this argument within the 
larger ineffective assistance claim as it related to counsel‘s failure to interview known 
eyewitnesses.  Pennsylvania procedural rules make clear that arguments not explicitly 
raised in the PCRA petition are waived.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 902(B) (―Each ground relied 
upon in support of the relief requested shall be stated in the [PCRA] petition.  Failure to 
state such a ground in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude the defendant from raising that 
ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief.‖); Pa. R. App. P. 302(a) 
(―Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal.‖).  Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts routinely decline to consider on appeal an 
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argument that was not explicitly raised in the PCRA petition.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted) (stating that ―[c]laims not 
raised in the PCRA court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal‖); 
Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted) (finding 
appellant‘s claims were ―separately and independently waived because, as appellant 
admit[ed], he failed to raise them in the PCRA court‖); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 
A.2d 935, 940 n.4 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted) (declining to consider on appeal an issue 
that was not properly presented in the post-conviction petition).  Relying on 
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 114 (Pa. 1998), the Superior Court observed 
in Wayne-2 that trial counsel‘s failure to present evidence promised in the opening 
statement was mentioned in the PCRA petition ―only as a constituent element of a 
broader claim concerning counsel‘s failure to investigate and present exculpatory 
eyewitness testimony.‖  (A. 587.)  Wayne‘s failure to raise and argue this issue discretely 
before the PCRA court precluded him from raising it subsequently on appeal before the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Consequently, the claim was dismissed on procedural 
grounds and not considered on the merits. 
 In the federal habeas proceeding, the District Court concluded that the Superior 
Court‘s waiver ruling constituted an independent and adequate state ground for denying 
habeas relief.  We agree with the District Court‘s comprehensive analysis.  Wayne‘s 
ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel‘s failure to present evidence that was 
promised during opening statements is procedurally defaulted because Wayne did not 
comply with the clear and unambiguous Pennsylvania rules that require each claim to be 
12 
 
separately and explicitly asserted in the PCRA petition.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 902(B); Pa. 
R. App. P. 302(a).   
B. 
 For similar reasons, Wayne is also barred from raising the ineffective assistance 
claim as it relates to the failure to investigate known eyewitnesses.  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court in Wayne-2 remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing predicated 
entirely on the prospect of Raygina‘s potential testimony.
7
  Raygina‘s death nullified the 
sole basis for granting the hearing.  Accordingly, Wayne asked the PCRA court to 
postpone the evidentiary hearing and then submitted a memorandum of law regarding the 
admissibility of Raygina‘s statement as substantive evidence.  The PCRA court 
subsequently denied Wayne‘s request to admit Raygina‘s declaration as substantive 
evidence and dismissed the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.  Wayne 
appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court (Wayne-3).  
                                            
 
7
 Wayne-2 did not remand for an evidentiary hearing to investigate the 
representations made by Diana Fearon and Dominique Long because their statements 
were explicitly excluded from consideration for failing to adhere to the PCRA affidavit 
requirement.  In an ineffective assistance claim for failing to interview a witness, 
Pennsylvania requires a valid affidavit and ―will not grant relief based on an allegation 
that a certain witness may have testified in the absence of an affidavit from that witness 
to show that the witness would, in fact, testify.‖  Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 
422-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citation omitted).  Pennsylvania‘s ―affidavit rule‖ was 
firmly established in Khalil, which was issued on August 2, 2002.  Id.  Wayne filed his 
appellate brief with the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Wayne-2 on April 7, 2003, 
approximately eight months after the Khalil decision.  Therefore, Wayne had proper 
notice of Pennsylvania‘s ―affidavit rule.‖  Accordingly, Diane Fearon and Dominique 
Long‘s statements were procedurally barred based on firmly established Pennsylvania 
law.    
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 In his submission to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Wayne-3, Wayne‘s one 
argument section was devoted entirely to the admissibility of Raygina‘s hearsay 
statement.  Wayne‘s other arguments – including the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim for failure to investigate Raygina – were not properly ―followed by such discussion 
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.‖  Thomas, 908 A.2d at 353 (quoting 
Pa. R. App. P. 2119(a)).  Thus, Wayne did not set forth counsel‘s alleged ineffectiveness 
as a stand-alone basis for relief.  The Superior Court dismissed this ineffective assistance 
claim because it did not comply with Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.  See Pa. R. App. P. 2119(a) (stating that ―[t]he argument shall be 
divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head 
of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point 
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 
pertinent‖); see also Berg v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., 822 A.2d 810, 815 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2003) (citation omitted) (failing to comply with the mandate of Rule 2119(a) results 
in a waiver of issues); Boutte v. Seitchik, 719 A.2d 319, 326 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) 
(stating that improperly commingling a claim in an argument pertaining to an appellant‘s 
other issues on appeal violates Rule 2119(a)); Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1381 
n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding the appellant‘s ―brief violate[d] Rule 2119(a) because it 
[was] not divided into as many parts as there [were] questions to be argued, nor [was] the 
particular point to be addressed set out at the head of each part in distinctive type or 
distinctively displayed‖).   
14 
 
 Wayne‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as it relates to the failure to 
investigate Raygina is barred from habeas review on adequate and independent state law 
grounds because Wayne did not comply with Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.    
C.  
 Thus, both of Wayne‘s ineffective assistance claims were defaulted in successive 
proceedings because Wayne did not comply with clearly established Pennsylvania 
procedural rules.  We may excuse Wayne‘s procedural defaults only upon a showing of 
―cause and prejudice‖ or a ―fundamental miscarriage of justice.‖  Lines v. Larkins, 208 
F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  To establish cause and prejudice, Wayne 
―must demonstrate some objective factor external to the defense that prevented 
compliance with the state‘s procedural requirements.‖  Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 
412 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).   
 Both of Wayne‘s claims were barred on procedural grounds because of his failure 
to comply with Pennsylvania procedural requirements.  Raygina‘s death did not, and 
could not, cause Wayne to violate the applicable Pennsylvania rules of procedure.  See 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1986) (explaining that counsel‘s ignorance or 
inadvertence is not ―cause‖ and the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error). 
 To establish a ―fundamental miscarriage of justice,‖ Wayne must show ―actual 
innocence.‖  Cristin, 281 F.3d at 420 (citation omitted).  A habeas petitioner must 
persuade the court ―that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Id. (citation omitted); see also 
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Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 523 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that ―[n]ew reliable 
evidence is almost always required to establish actual innocence‖).  New reliable 
evidence could consist of ―exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 
accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.‖  Sweger, 294 
F.3d at 523 (citations omitted).  Raygina‘s hearsay declaration falls short of this standard 
and Wayne cannot establish actual innocence based on the hearsay evidence of a 
deceased witness alone. 
D. 
 In the absence of Raygina‘s anticipated testimony, there was no direct evidentiary 
support for the failure to investigate claim.  Thus, we directed the parties to address the 
question of whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court‘s ruling barring Raygina‘s 
declaration constitutes an ―adequate and independent‖ state-law ground for denying the 
claim.
8
  We hold that the decision to deny admission of Raygina‘s hearsay declaration is 
an ―adequate and independent‖ state-law ground for denying the claim and is not eligible 
                                            
 
8
 We also directed the parties to address whether Wayne ―failed,‖ by reason of 
waiver or otherwise, to develop the factual basis for the failure to investigate claim in 
state court, such that the District Court was precluded from holding an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).  The decision to grant an evidentiary 
hearing is left to the sound discretion of district courts.  See Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 
204, 220-221 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, district courts ―focus on 
whether a new evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in that a new hearing would 
have the potential to advance the petitioner‘s claim.‖  Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 
287 (3d Cir. 2000).  A hearing on Wayne‘s claim would not be meaningful because there 
is no direct evidence to advance his position in the absence of Raygina‘s testimony.  
Therefore, the District Court acted well within its discretion when it denied Wayne‘s 
request for a hearing.   
16 
 
for federal habeas review because it does not rise to the level of constitutional error.  See, 
e.g., Bisaccia v. Att’y Gen. of N. J., 623 F.2d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 1980).   
 Wayne also presented the denial of the hearsay declaration as a due process 
violation based on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and its statement that 
―where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, 
the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.‖  Id. at 
302.  Chambers is readily distinguishable.  Raygina‘s declaration was inadmissible based 
on traditional concerns associated with hearsay evidence.  Raygina‘s death made her 
―unavailable‖ under Rule 804(a)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, and her 
statement did not bear ―adequate indicia of reliability, such as when the statement falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or is supported by a particularized guarantee of 
trustworthiness.‖  Thomas, 908 A.2d at 354 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Superior Court noted that ―if the Declaration was admitted as substantive 
evidence, the Commonwealth would not have the opportunity to test [Raygina‘s] 
eyewitness account of the incident and her identification of the man who murdered the 
victim as not being [Wayne] on cross-examination.‖  Id. at 355. (citation omitted).  
Moreover, even though the statement was signed subject to the penalty of perjury, it did 
not qualify as an affidavit because Raygina ―did not swear her statements before an 
officer authorized to administer oaths.‖  Id. at 354 (citations omitted).  As the Superior 
Court observed, ―the statement of a witness taken by the defense under circumstances 
privy only to the defense does not establish the requisite trustworthiness that is necessary 
for admissibility.‖  Id.  (citation omitted).  In sum, the Pennsylvania Superior Court‘s 
17 
 
sound reasoning for denying the hearsay declaration is in no way contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of Chambers.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s decision to deny 
Wayne‘s habeas petition.      
